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PRELIMINARY HEARINGS IN VIRGINIA
G. WILLIAM HAMMER*
If there is any area of criminal practice in Virginia that could be
considered the neglected child, it is the preliminary hearing.' That
neglect has all too frequently manifested itself in conduct by lawyers
at preliminary hearings that could only be grounded in a basic mis-
understanding of the purposes, procedures, and substaritive law
governing preliminary hearings. It appears that many lawyers con-
clude that they know the law of preliminary hearings simply be-
cause they know the general field of criminal law and the adjuncts
of trials. Such a conclusion does not necessarily follow. A prelimi-
nary hearing is a specialized procedure in Virginia that is not the
same as a criminal trial. Thus, it is important for a lawyer to under-
stand precisely both what the preliminary hearing is, and what it is
not.
This Article is an attempt to provide to the practitioner a concise
summary of the law of preliminary hearings in Virginia in an effort
to promote a better understanding of the procedure by the criminal
bar. It also attempts to eliminate some of the more common miscon-
ceptions concerning these hearings. Because many of these miscon-
ceptions are widespread and could color the reader's perception of
a discussion of what the preliminary hearing is, this Article will
begin with what it is not.
* A.B., Ball State University; J.D., George Washington University. General District Court
Judge, Nineteenth Judicial District of Virginia.
1. In Virginia, the term "preliminary hearing" refers to a statutory proceeding in which
probable cause to prosecute, based on evidence designed to show that a felony has been
committed by the accused, is determined. Care should be taken not to confuse this procedure
with the many other types of probable cause determinations that are sometimes referred to
in the literature as preliminary hearings. In Virginia, for example, five formal or informal
probable cause determinations are made in a typical felony case: (1) the determination by
the magistrate whether to issue a warrant; (2) an initial determination by a judicial officer
whether to release an accused on bond; (3) the determination at the preliminary hearing
whether to certify the case to the grand jury; (4) the determination by the grand jury whether
to indict the accused and put him to trial; and (5) the determination by the Commonwealth's
attorney whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute the trial. This Article will deal
only with the third determination, the preliminary hearing in Virginia.
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WHAT IT Is NoT
Constitutional Right
The preliminary hearing is not a right guaranteed by the Consti-
tution of the United States;2 nor is it a right guaranteed by the
constitution of Virginia.3 It is a creature of statute and was first
introduced in Virginia in 1804.' The present statute provides:
No person who is arrested ona charge of felony shall be denied a
preliminary hearing upon the question whether there is reasona-
ble ground to believe that he committed the offense and no in-
dictment shall be returned in a court of record against any person
prior to such hearing unless such hearing is waived in writing by
the accused.'
This statute is not a broad guarantee of a preliminary hearing to
criminal defendants. The statutory right has been limited to cases
in which the accused is arrested on a felony charge prior to indict-
ment.' The right under the statute has been further limited to arrest
on a warrant, and the Supreme Court of Virginia has refused to
extend the meaning of arrest to a case in which the defendant volun-
tarily went to a police station for questioning before his eventual
indictment and conviction.7
Even when arrested on a felony charge prior to indictment, the
accused may be denied a preliminary hearing without violating due
process. In Benson v. Commonwealth,8 the defendant had been ar-
rested on a warrant and had insisted on a preliminary hearing before
the witnesses appeared before the grand jury. The Commonwealth's
attorney dismissed the warrant and took the case directly to the
grand jury for indictment. On appeal, the defendant contended that
he had been denied a preliminary hearing. In affirming the convic-
tion, the supreme court stated:
2. Ashby v. Cox, 344 F. Supp. 759 (W.D. Va. 1972).
3. Benson v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 744, 58 S.E.2d 312 (1950).
4. See generally 5B MicmFs JURISPRUDENCE Criminal Procedure § 17, at n.16 ( ).
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-218 (Repl. Vol. 1975). See also VA. SuP. CT. R. 3A: 5-1(b)(1).
6. Webb v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 24, 129 S.E.2d 22 (1963). In Webb, the Supreme Court
of Virginia stated that due process was not denied when the defendant was not given a
preliminary hearing, because the defendant had not been arrested before indictment. The
court then proceeded to reverse the lower court on other grounds.
7. Land v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 223, 176 S.E.2d 586 (1970).
8. 190 Va. 744, 58 S.E.2d 312 (1950).
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The Commonwealth's attorney had complete authority over the
conduct of the prosecution and was at liberty to dismiss the war-
rant if he thought it would expedite the proceedings. We hold
under the circumstances, the defendant had no right, either sta-
tutory or constitutional, to be afforded a preliminary hearing
prior to the finding of the indictment or to his trial thereof.9
This proposition was recently affirmed by the supreme court in a
slightly different form in Waye v. Commonwealth. 10 In that case, the
defendant was convicted of capital murder, although he had origi-
nally been arrested on a non-capital charge of first degree murder.
Thereafter the Commonwealth's attorney obtained both capital and
first degree murder indictments. He proceeded to trial only on the
capital offense. The court held that this did not circumvent the
defendant's statutory right to a preliminary hearing. Citing the stat-
ute, the court held that he was not denied his statutory right be-
cause he had not been arrested on capital murder, but had been
indicted directly on that charge. It further held that this was not
manipulative."
Finally, the statute does not guarantee a second preliminary hear-
ing on retrial. In May v. Peyton,12 the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia denied the defendant's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus when the petition was based on the lack
of a second preliminary hearing before retrial after the defendant's
original trial and sentence had been set aside. The court held that
the defendant had no right to a second hearing under the statute.
Discovery Vehicle
The preliminary hearing is not a discovery vehicle. Despite some
language in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Coleman v. Alabama 3 that suggests a broader interpretation, the
Supreme Court of Virginia would seem to limit discovery of the type
discussed in Coleman to that which naturally flows from the presen-
tation of the evidence. 4 Although two of the relevant cases were
9. Id. at 750, 58 S.E.2d at 314.
10. 219 Va. -, 251 S.E.2d 202 (1979).
11. Id. at _, 251 S.E.2d at 206.
12. 268 F. Supp. 928 (W.D. Va. 1967).
13. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
14. Davis v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 816, 213 S.E.2d 785 (1975); Foster v. Commonwealth,
209 Va. 297, 163 S.E.2d 565 (1968); Williams v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 724, 160 S.E.2d 781
(1968).
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decided before Coleman, this proposition was affirmed five years
after Coleman in Davis v. Commonwealth. 15
Double Jeopardy and Related Matters
The most recent Virginia case detailing the many things that a
preliminary hearing is not was Moore v. Commonwealth. 16 In Moore,
the defendant was arrested in 1974 on two felony warrants and
charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and
possession of hashish, respectively. At the preliminary hearing, after
all the evidence was introduced, the District Court judge
"'dismissed' "17 both warrants. Subsequently, the Commonwealth's
attorney obtained indictments on both charges. After a motion to
quash the indictments was denied, the defendant was convicted in
a bench trial. She thereafter appealed, alleging numerous grounds
arising from the dismissal of the charges at the preliminary hearing.
In Moore, the supreme court stated clearly there was no double
jeopardy on these facts because jeopardy does not attach until the
defendant is "put to trial before that trier of facts," and a prelimi-
nary hearing is not a trial. 8 The defendant had contended that the
district court was required under Virginia law to try her at the
preliminary hearing on lesser included offenses if there was a finding
of no probable cause with respect to the felony charge and if the
lesser included offenses were misdemeanors, thus within the juris-
diction of the district court. She argued that the failure to try her
on these lesser offenses following a full evidentiary hearing and her
release following the hearing must be taken as an acquittal on the
lesser included offenses. The court noted that while the Code of
Virginia 9 permitted the district court to try the accused on the
lesser offense, no such immediate trial was required. 0 The court
further stated that the defendant had not been put to trial, absent
a showing that she had been arraigned on a misdemeanor. The court
refused to assume, absent any record to the contrary, that she was
tried and acquitted of a misdemeanor.2'
15. 215 Va. 816, 213 S.E.2d 785 (1975).
16. 218 Va. 388, 237 S.E.2d 187 (1977).
17. Id. at 389, 237 S.E.2d at 189.
18. Id. at 392, 237 S.E.2d at 190.
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-106 (1950) (recodified at § 19.2-186).
20. 218 Va. at 391-92, 237 S.E.2d at 190-91. But see Rouzie v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 174,
207 S.E.2d 854 (1974).
21. 218 Va. at 392, 237 S.E.2d at 191.
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Continuing in Moore, the court rejected the defendant's claim
that the indictment of a criminal defendant on a felony warrant can
be accomplished only by way of preliminary hearing. The court said
that had the legislature intended to forever bar the bringing of an
indictment after a finding of no probable cause by a district court
the statute would have so stated.2 Finally, the court in Moore re-
jected the proposition that these facts entailed an "upping of the
ante," as proscribed by the United States Supreme Court in
Blackledge v. Perry,2 by elevating a misdemeanor into a felony on
trial de novo. The Virginia Supreme Court observed that there was
no conviction in the district court, no appeal to the circuit court,
and therefore no upping of the ante.24
WHAT IT IS
Thus, in summary, the preliminary hearing is not a constitutional
right, a discovery vehicle, or a trial in itself. Having disposed of
these common misconceptions, it is appropriate to consider now
what the preliminary hearing is.
As previously noted, the preliminary hearing is a statutory right
applicable in the limited circumstances of arrest on a felony charge
prior to indictment on that charge.2 The metes and bounds of pre-
liminary hearings have been laid out by the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia in two leading cases that outline the total extent of the juris-
diction of the district court. These cases are Williams v.
Commonwealth"8 and Foster v. Commonwealth,2 both decided in
1968. A discussion of both of these cases is warranted despite their
essentially identical facts. These cases have interpreted the princi-
pal preliminary hearing statute to limit the preliminary hearing in
the bounds of evidence for and against the accused.
In Williams, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder
and on appeal contended, inter alia, that he was denied a prelimi-
nary hearing as required by law. At the close of the Common-
wealth's evidence, the attorney for the Commonwealth moved that
22. Id.
23. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
24. 218 Va. at 396, 237 S.E.2d at 193.
25. See notes 5-11 supra & accompanying text.
26. 208 Va. 724, 160 S.E.2d 781 (1968).
27. 209 Va. 297, 163 S.E.2d 565 (1968).
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-183 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
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the case be certified to the grand jury. Over the objection of defense
counsel, the court certified the case to the circuit court and refused
to permit the defendant to call witnesses concerning an alleged
confession. In affirming the conviction, the Virginia Supreme Court
stated:
The county judge had only one issue to decide when he presided
at Williams's preliminary hearing, whether there was sufficient
cause for charging Williams with murder or, in other words,
whether there was reasonable ground to believe a murder had
been committed and Williams was the person who had commit-
ted the murder. At William's preliminary hearing the Common-
wealth produced three witnesses whose testimony showed Wil-
liams had killed Sarver. The attorney for the Commonwealth
then moved the county judge to certify the case, so there was no
reason to hear further evidence against the accused. . . . Defense
counsel therefore had the right to present evidence for Williams,
that is, to show there was no reasonable ground for belief that
Williams had committed murder. But counsel did not represent
to the county judge that they wished to offer testimony for that
purpose. Instead they represented that they wished to call wit-
nesses respecting an incriminating statement and a confession
made by Williams. 9
In Foster, the defendants had subpoenaed eleven police officers
at the preliminary hearing. After the Commonwealth had presented
its evidence, the defendants attempted to produce lengthy testi-
mony on their behalf. The Commonwealth's attorney objected to
such examination on the ground that it was a mere fishing expedi-
tion. The court refused to permit counsel to examine the police
officers and, after stating that there was probable cause, certified
the case to the grand jury. In affirming on appeal, the supreme
court, following Williams, sanctioned the action of the county judge
in the absence of a representation that the proffered testimony
would show no crime was committed or that the defendants were not
connected with it.30
An initial reading of these cases could lead one to interpret them
as representing a fine distinction by the supreme court concerning
what constitutes evidence for the accused. Careful consideration of
29. 208 Va. at 728-29, 160 S.E.2d at 784 (footnote and citations omitted).
30. 209 Va, at 300-01, 163 S.E.2d at 567-68.
630 [Vol. 20:625
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the import of these cases indicates, however, that if the issue is a
decision for the trier of fact, then it is not within the jurisdiction of
the district court. Thus, the defense is limited to presenting evi-
dence of the type that would support summary judgment or a di-
rected verdict. Defense counsel must distinguish between improba-
bility and impossibility in this respect. The alibi defense offers an
excellent illustration. It is for the trier of fact to weigh the credibility
of defense testimony that it is probable the accused was not present,
but if defense evidence shows impossibility to commit the offense,
such as being incarcerated at the time, the decision would lie within
the purview of the court.
The distinction mentioned above does not preclude the district
court from sitting as a trier of fact on at least two is-
sues-unreasonable search and seizure and the validity of confes-
sions-but only if a decision in favor of the defendant would negate
either the existence of a crime or any link between the crime and
the defendant. If the lower court should find that a confession was
involuntary or that a proper Miranda warning was not given, and if
the confession were the only link connecting the defendant to the
offense, the district court should suppress the confession and dis-
miss the case. Similarly, the issue of an unreasonable search and
seizure might require suppression of evidence of the crime. Surely
if a warrantless search were made when a warrant was required, or
if that warrant were defective, the court would have the jurisdiction
to suppress. The suppression of the corpus delicti of a crime would
be the equivalent of no felony having been committed.
Reversible Error and Waiver
The preliminary hearing is one instance in which the district
court can commit reversible error. To take advantage of this, the
accused must move to quash the indictment for failure to receive a
proper preliminary hearing. Failure to raise the objection in this
manner constitutes a waiver of the objection, as illustrated in
Snyder v. Commonwealth.31 In Snyder, the defendant was charged
with grand larcency. Following the Commonwealth's evidence at
the preliminary hearing, the defendant moved to strike, which mo-
tion was taken under advisement. With no indication whether the
motion was granted or denied, the defendant was indicted, tried,
31. 202 Va. 1009, 121 S.E.2d 452 (1961).
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and convicted. Forty-seven days after the final order of conviction
the objection was raised. The Virginia Supreme Court held that the
preliminary hearing was procedural, not jurisdictional, and that the
accused may waive a procedural step. Failure to raise the issue
before trial was in effect a waiver, and being waived, the lack of a
proper preliminary hearing was forever lost as a ground for objec-
tion.32
A similar issue was raised in Robertson v. Riddle, 3 in which the
defendant filed for habeas corpus on the ground that the presiding
judge at the preliminary hearing was not a member of the Virginia
bar. The defendant failed to raise this point prior to trial and did
not raise it on appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia. The court
held that the judge's qualifications failed to raise a constitutional
issue, and that lacking constitutional stature, the objection was lost
by the failure to raise it in a timely fashion.34
The preliminary hearing statute" specifically makes the waiver
personal to the defendant. In Triplett v. Commonwealth, '3 for exam-
ple, the defendant had been declared an habitual offender. He was
arrested for driving a car in violation of the Virginia Habitual Of-
fenders Act" and, upon conviction, was given a one-year sentence.
On appeal, he alleged that he had not been given a preliminary
hearing and had not waived it. The Virginia Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the criminal statute involved did not preclude
the need for a preliminary hearing. Where the defendant insists on
his statutory rights, failure to honor those rights is reversible error.31
Juvenile Court Proceedings
Proceedings in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court take
on a different complexion when juvenile offenders are involved. In
that court, the preliminary hearing is jurisdictional rather than pro-
cedural. This doctrine is set forth in Peyton v. French,3 9 in which
ten felony petitions were obtained after the defendant was commit-
32. Id. at 1014, 121 S.E.2d at 456.
33. 402 F. Supp. 144 (W.D. Va. 1975).
34. Id. at 146.
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-183 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
36. 212 Va. 649, 186 S.E.2d 16 (1972).
37. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-387.1 to -387.12 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
38. 212 Va. at 651, 186 S.E.2d at 17.
39. 207 Va. 73, 147 S.E.2d 739 (1966).
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ted to Beaumont learning center for a status offense. The defendant
was then summarily certified to the circuit court in a hearing at
which his parents were not present, for no notice had been given
them; nor had a guardian ad litem been appointed at the time of
the hearing. The defendant was returned to the circuit court where
counsel was appointed. Upon being arraigned, the defendant en-
tered pleas of guilty to all charges. Subsequently a writ of habeas
corpus was granted, the supreme court stating:
A hearing held under the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
Law is not as limited in its scope as a preliminary hearing under
the criminal procedures applicable to an adult. The juvenile
court judge is expressly empowered with the discretion of either
retaining jurisdiction of the child charged with the commission
of a felony or certifying the child for criminal proceedings in a
proper court of record."
In Evans v. Cox,' however, the petitioner sought a writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that the juvenile court had summarily certi-
fied his case to the circuit court without a preliminary hearing. He
alleged that his parents were not present and that no guardian ad
litem had been appointed. In the circuit court, a pre-trial report had
been ordered and filed. The defendant's attorney moved in the cir-
cuit court that he be tried as a juvenile. After a hearing, the motion
was denied; thereafter, the petitioner entered a plea of guilty and
was sentenced. In response to his petition for habeas corpus, citing
Peyton, the United States district court denied the writ, stating:
Evans was not certified for trial as an adult after a hearing by the
juvenile court and the jurisdictional and procedural requirements
for juvenile court hearings were not followed. Rather, the Circuit
Court judge made his independent determination to try Evans as
an adult after examining the pre-trial report prepared by the
probation officer. Nothing more was required, and Evans' conten-
tion that the jurisdictional requirements for juvenile court hear-
ings was not followed has no bearing on the validity of his convic-
tion and sentence.42
40. Id. at 78, 147 S.E.2d at 742.
41. 327 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Va. 1971).
42. Id. at 1060.
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INCIDENTS OF A PRELIMINARY HEARING
Counsel
The right to assistance of counsel at a probable cause determi-
nation of the Virginia preliminary hearing type was established as
a constitutional right by the United States Supreme Court in the
case of Coleman v. Alabama.43 The Court declared that the Ala-
bama preliminary hearing was a "critical stage" of the state's crimi-
nal process." At a critical stage, the defendant is entitled to the
assistance of counsel, just as at the trial itself. It should be noted
that this constitutional right to the assistance of counsel should not
be construed in any manner as a constitutional right to a prelimi-
nary hearing. The rule is that while no preliminary hearing is consti-
tutionally required in Virginia, when such a hearing is held anyway,
the defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel at that hear-
ing.45
The doctrine of Coleman quickly passed into Virginia law through
the federal courts. Coleman was followed almost immediately by the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Phillips v. North Caro-
lina." In Phillips, the defendant filed for a writ of habeas corpus
on the ground that he had been denied counsel at his preliminary
hearing. The court agreed that under North Carolina law the pre-
liminary hearing was a critical stage, but held that the application
of Coleman was not retroactive.47
Thereafter, Noe v. Cox" arose in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia. The defendant had pled guilty
to eight felony counts in 1961 and received eight consecutive ten
year terms. He filed a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that
he had been denied the assistance of counsel at his preliminary
hearing. Holding that the rule enunciated in Coleman and followed
in Phillips was applicable in Virginia, the Court again refused to
apply Coleman retroactively.49
43. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
44. Id. at 9-10.
45. Id. See also C. WHiTEBREAD, C6NSTrrUTONAL CUMINAL PROCEDURE 259-60 (1978).
46. 433 F.2d 659 (4th Cir. 1970).
47. Id. at 662-63.
48. 320 F. Supp. 849 (W.D. Va. 1970). See also Evans v. Cox, 327 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Va.
1971).
49. 320 F. Supp. at 851. The court justified this refusal to apply Coleman retroactively by




The question of providing a transcript of the preliminary hearing
is a matter dealt with by statute. One section of the Virginia Code0
appears to vest this authority in the circuit court. Another section
of the Code,5' however, does not restrict the authority to the court
of record; rather it provides that a judge may require testimony to
be reduced to writing. It would also appear that this determination
is an inherent power of the court if, in its sound discretion, it would
further the ends of justice.
In Bird v. Peyton,5" the defendant sought a writ of habeas corpus
on the ground that he had been denied a petition for a court reporter
at his preliminary hearing. In denying the writ, the United States
district court held:
The appointment of a reporter for petitioner in the preliminary
hearing may well have aided the petitioner in his defense but this
court is not aware of any requirement for such reporting and its
failure certainly does not violate any constitutional rights of peti-
tioner.53
Subsequently, in the case of Young v. Commonwealth,54 the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of the lack of a
transcript of the preliminary hearing. The defendant had been ad-
vised that one would be made available to him, but it was later
discovered that no transcript could be made because the electronic
recording equipment had malfunctioned. The court stated that
Roberts v. LaVallee,51 which held that a person could not be denied
a transcript because of his indigency, had no application. Recogniz-
ing that the malfunction was unfortunate, the court concluded it
neither violated the defendant's constitutional right to equal protec-
tion nor interfered with the defendant's substantive rights to a fair
hearing.
view of the possible prejudice to justice. The court, after noting that there is seldom a
transcript of a preliminary hearing, stated that it was reluctant "to release an untold number
of guilty defendants who had received a fair trial in a court of record" simply because
witnesses had died, left for places unknown, or could not revive memories clouded with lapse
of time. Id.
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-165 (Repl. Vol. 1975). See also VA. Sup. CT. R. 5(b)(1).
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-185 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
52. 287 F. Supp. 860 (W.D. Va. 1968).
53. Id. at 862.
54. 218 Va. 885, 241 S.E.2d 797 (1978).
55. 389 U.S. 40 (1967).
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Trial Tactics
The Virginia Supreme Court has refused to rule on the trial tac-
tics of defense counsel at a preliminary hearing. In Davis v.
Commonwealth,55 the court recognized that it was purely a matter
of judgment whether an attorney had participated in the prelimi-
nary hearing in an aggressive manner.57 Aggressive participation or
the lack of it by the attorneys representing a defendant does not
mean they are ineffective and incompetent, thereby entitling the
defendant to a second preliminary hearing. This proposition has
been affirmed by the United States district court in the case of
Saunders v. Slayton."8 The court determined that mistakes in tac-
tics employed at a preliminary hearing do not deprive the accused
of his constitutional rights.
Lesser Offenses
As noted in Moore v. Commonwealth,59 the district court may find
lack of probable cause for the felony charge and instead charge the
accused with a misdemeanor, where justified by the evidence. It
would also follow that the district court, after an evidentiary hear-
ing, may certify on a lesser felony if some specific element is lack-
ing. 0 On the other hand, defense counsel may move at the close of
the Commonwealth's case involving the distribution of drugs other
than marijuana that the case be certified as a Class 5 felony, rather
than as a felony for which the penalty as a first offender is five to
forty years, because it involved only an accommodation sale.' Such
motion should be denied. In Stillwell v. Commonwealth,"2 the su-
preme court stated that evidence of accommodation went to the
punishment and did not create two separate offenses.63
56. 215 Va. 816, 213 S.E.2d 785 (1975).
57. In determining how active a role to play in preliminary hearings, see Shifflett v. Com-
monwealth, 218 Va. 25, 235 S.E.2d 316 (1977).
58. 348 F. Supp. 547 (W.D. Va. 1972).
59. 218 Va. 388, 237 S.E.2d 187 (1977).
60. For example, lack of proof of malice reduces the offense of hurling a missile at an
occupied vehicle from a Class 4 to a Class 6 felony. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248 (Cum. Supp.
1979).
61. Id.
62. 219 Va. 214, 247 S.E.2d 360 (1978).
63. The court stated:
§ 18.2-248(a) in our view, creates only a single offense, that being the
unlawful manufacture, sale, transfer or distribution, or possession with the in-
[Vol. 20:625
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Jurisdiction to Set or Modify Bond
Another problem that presents itself frequently, and which proba-
bly can never reach the supreme court, has been the question of
when the district court loses jurisdiction of the case. This problem
occurs after the judge has found probable cause and announced his
decision to certify the case to the grand jury. Immediately there-
after, counsel moves to reduce bond in the district court, his client
being incarcerated. Is this a proper motion, or has jurisdiction been
immediately transferred to the circuit court? A truly definitive an-
swer must await legislative action. As a practical matter, if the
district court has jurisdiction of the case on the day of the prelimi-
nary hearing, it should at least be considered as having it all day.
No mischief would result in further consideration of the bond the
same day. This would be more expeditious than requiring the defen-
dant to await the opportunity to be heard on this matter on motion
in the circuit court.
Evidence
The rules of evidence applicable to preliminary hearings have not
been clearly delineated by the Supreme Court of Virginia. 4 The
biggest controversy has been over whether hearsay should be admit-
ted. On a broad, nationwide basis, the proponents for the admission
of hearsay argue that it is often reliable enough for a probable cause
hearing, that it eliminates the need for one appearance by witnesses
who are reluctant to get involved, and that the grand jury can indict
on hearsay. It is also argued that the rules of evidence should be
about the same as are required for a magistrate to issue a warrant.
The opponents urge that hearsay should be excluded for the same
reason that it is excluded at trial: unreliability. They further urge
that hearsay denies the defendant the right to confrontation and the
right of cross-examination, and that the defendant should be bound
tent to manufacture, sell, give, distribute or possess certain controlled drugs.
The provisions of § 18.2-248(a), which deal with the reduced penalty contingent
upon proof of an accommodation gift, distribution or possession of marijuana
operate only to mitigate the degree of criminality or punishment, rather than
to create two substantive offenses as the defendants contend.
Id. at 222, 247 S.E.2d at 365.
64. For general discussion of the applicability of the rules of evidence to preliminary hear-
ings in Virginia, see a companion article in this issue of the William and Mary Law Review
by Charles E. Friend.
1979]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
over and put to trial only on reliable evidence.
While all states do not have preliminary hearings, it would appear
that those that do are split fairly evenly on the question of the
admission of hearsay. The general district courts in Virginia are not
in agreement as to the admission of hearsay, 5 and the supreme
court has not been called upon to rule on this point. In Clodfelter
v. Commonwealth,"6 the supreme court held that once the hearsay
admitted at the preliminary hearing was excluded from the record,
the evidence failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was guilty and reversed the conviction. The court, how-
ever, neither approved nor disapproved the admission of hearsay
during the preliminary hearing.
The proponents for admitting hearsay at the preliminary hearing
rely upon the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This argument
is not directly applicable to the controversy in Virginia, however,
because a specific provision for receiving hearsay was added in
1972.7
The hearsay question may ultimately be brought before the Su-
preme Court of Virginia. If this does occur, the author feels that the
court should exclude hearsay. Support for this proposition is
founded on a critical analysis of section 19.2-183 of the Code of
Virginia. This statute provides that at a preliminary hearing the
judge shall hear evidence for and against the accused. Had the
legislature intended that hearsay be admitted it would have so
stated or provided that the district court receive evidence against
the accused only. In providing that the judge shall hear evidence for
the accused, the legislature must have intended that hearsay should
be excluded. The statute further bolsters this position by providing
that the accused may testify and introduce witnesses in his own
behalf. The most important provision in the statute is the right of
the accused to cross-examine witnesses. It is here we find in the
statute the common law test of the reliability of testimony. Given
this, there is no reliable standard by which the district court judge
65. In a recent survey of Virginia district court judges, 55 of 61 judges responding applied
all rules of evidence at preliminary hearings; 5 did not apply the hearsay rule but did apply
all others; and 1 applied the hearsay rule only in serious cases, such as rape or murder. Friend,
The Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Hearings in Virginia, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 646
(1979).
66. 218 Va. 619, 238 S.E.2d 820 (1977).
67. FED. R. CraM. P. 5.1(a). The Federal Rules of Evidence exclude preliminary hearings
from their scope altogether. FED. R. EVID. 1101.
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can reach a reasoned decision except by the exclusion of hearsay.
This proposition is supported by Williams v. Commonwealth" and
Foster v. Commonwealth." This position is also legally consistent
with the lack of restrictions upon a grand jury in the use of hearsay,
for the grand jury is not bound by statute to hear evidence for the
accused.
The author also considers this proposition to be supported by
Coleman v. Alabama.70 There the Supreme Court of the United
States said, "[S]killed examination and cross-examination of wit-
nesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the State's case tha may
lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over."' 7' The Court
also stated that "skilled interrogation of witnesses . . . can fashion
a vital impeachment tool . . . at trial. '7 2
At this time, the reception of hearsay at the preliminary hearing
can be decided definitively only with legislative amendment or a
rule of the Supreme Court of Virginia. The author recommends that
such action be taken to exclude hearsay conclusively.
Burden of Proof
Another evidentiary problem that lawyers frequently seem to con-
fuse is the burden of proof. Many feel that the Commonwealth is
put to the burden of proving the case beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court of the United States dealt with this quantum
of proof in 1949 in the case of Brinegar v. United States.7 3 After
holding that guilt in a criminal case had to be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, they held that less proof was required in a prob-
able cause hearing, stating, "'The substance of all the definitions
of probable is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.' And this
means less than evidence which would justify condemnation or con-
viction."74
Although the amount of proof has not been defined, it must be
more than mere suspicion. If it is enough to lead a reasonable man
to believe that the accused may have committed the offense, then
68. 208 Va. 724, 160 S.E.2d 781 (1968).
69. 209 Va. 297, 163 S.E.2d 565 (1968).
70. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
71. Id. at 9.
72. Id.
73. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
74. Id. at 175 (citations omitted)(quoting McCarthy v. DeArmit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881)).
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it is sufficient. In weighing the evidence, the standard probably is
defined as a preponderance of the evidence, in the same manner as
proof of issues other than guilt.
CONCLUSION
A preliminary hearing in Virginia is an adversary proceeding be-
fore a judicial officer to determine whether a felony has been com-
mitted and whether there is probable cause to believe the defendant
committed it. It is not a constitutional right guaranteed either
under the United States Constitution or under the constitution of
Virginia. The United States Supreme Court, however, has deter-
mined in Coleman v. Alabama that it is a "critical stage" of the
criminal process, thereby guaranteeing to the accused the constitu-
tional right to the assistance of counsel, but with the caveat that
Coleman will not be applied retroactively.
The preliminary hearing is procedural and not jurisdictional, ex-
cept in juvenile cases, and may be waived. Objection to the failure
to grant a preliminary hearing may be forever lost by failing to
assert it in a timely manner. Failure to observe the defendant's right
to a preliminary hearing when it is not waived constitutes reversible
error.
The preliminary hearing is not a trial on the merits and therefore
the guilt or innocence of the accused is not an issue. Accordingly, it
is not double jeopardy if the defendant is released, no probable
cause having been found, and then subsequently indicted and put
to trial. A preliminary hearing is not the only route to indictment,
but it may be required if the accused is arrested on a warrant. Arrest
on a warrant, however, does not foreclose the right of the Common-
wealth to dismiss the warrant prior to the preliminary hearing and
to present the charge directly to the grand jury for indictment.
The preliminary hearing is not a discovery vehicle. Further, coun-
sel's participation in the preliminary hearing, whether aggressive or
not, is not a matter for appellate review. Similarly, mistakes by
counsel in trial tactics at the preliminary hearing do not deprive the
defendant of his constitutional rights.
it is not settled in Virginia whether hearsay is or is not admissible
at preliminary hearings. The statute does provide that the judge at
such hearings shall hear evidence for and against the accused. The
defendant may testify and introduce evidence in his own behalf.
Finally, and of equal importance, he may cross-examine witnesses,
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the purpose of which is to test the truth of such testimony.
Overall, although this concept is difficult for many defense law-
yers to accept, the preliminary hearing is basically nothing more
than "show-and-tell" for the Commonwealth. To further complicate
comprehension, the basic nature of the law of preliminary hearings
is procedural, rather than substantive. Because it is not a trial, mere
knowledge of the incidents of trial is insufficient to properly prepare
an attorney for a preliminary hearing. The author urges all attor-
neys who participate in the criminal process to review their under-
standing of the preliminary hearing, not only to improve their own
performance, but also to facilitate the administration of justice.
